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I. INTRODUCTION
As a judge, I have worn two hats: that of a constitutional judge (of the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court) and that of an international human rights judge (of the European 
Court of Human Rights). These have been different judicial experiences.
A constitutional judge is concerned, first and foremost, with ensuring the suprem-
acy of a constitution as the supreme law of the land.2 The raison d’être of constitutional 
judicial review, in its original but enduring Kelsenian sense, lies in defending Grund-
norm and legal order’s hierarchy based on it. Constitutional courts3 are institutional 
means for ensuring that no act of lower legal force which is not concordant with 
1 Former Justice (1999–2008) and President (2002–2008) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania; Professor of the Faculty of Law of Vilnius University. The views expressed in the article are solely those 
of the author; they do not represent the attitude of the Court.
2 In Lithuania, individual constitutional complaint has not been introduced yet (the last attempt having 
failed in 2017). The Constitutional Court therefore acts almost exclusively as the court of norms. I limit myself to 
this part of constitutional courts’ competence, though in Europe many of them perform also other tasks, including 
the examination of constitutional complaints. Update-note after the submission of the article: A repeated attempt to 
introduce the constitutional complaint by means of a constitutional amendment has been undertaken in the fall of 
2018; the process has not been completed yet.
3 For the sake of convenience, in this article the expression “constitutional courts” covers all courts which 
perform constitutional review of legal acts (irrespective of whether they are separate from courts of general jurisdic-
tion or are part of their system), as well as equivalent bodies (such as constitutional councils exercising a priori 
review). The expressions “constitutional review” and “constitutional justice” also designate all types of judicial and 
equivalent review of constitutionality.
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Grundnorm remains valid law and, more generally, for ensuring the “abstract logical 
concordance between higher and lower legal acts”.4 Law would not rule, unless it is 
ruled itself by Grundnorm; if it is, it is a quality law. This minimalist approach falls 
short of the prevailing belief that the rule of law encompasses much more than formal 
hierarchy and that, to be of quality, law must meet some substantive standards (quite so). 
But it is this minimum that necessitates and enables the protection of the legal order 
by means of constitutional review. What is consolidated in a constitution is secondary 
for that order itself. Constitutional courts have a formalist task to perform. As to the 
substance, they can perform different functions. Constitutional order is an attribute of 
any polity, not only a democracy. Rogue states also have constitutions.5 Alas, constitu-
tional courts at times do yeoman service to dictatorships.6 Their existence per se does not 
ensure that the legal order will not only meet formal legality requirements, but also 
will be just (whatever that may mean). As of mid-2018, the World Conference on Con-
stitutional Justice unites 112 constitutional courts. But rejoicing about membership 
numbers7 must not outshine the fact that 2017 marked the 12th consecutive year of 
decline in global freedom;8 the number of countries designated as free stands at 88 
(45% of 195 polities);9 only 77 polities (of 210 surveyed) are full or flawed democracies, 
and others hybrid or authoritarian regimes.10 The latter are quite amply represented in 
the World Conference.11
Some form of supervision of hierarchy, of which judicial review is the apex, is a sine 
qua non for a consistent legal order and, by extension, for the rule of law. Incoherent legal 
order, where legal acts deviate from Grundnorm, would be of no assistance for any sub-
stantive justice. Constitutional justice’s formalist side thus must not be misprized. But 
4 B. Zupančić. “Constitutional Law and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: An 
Attempt at a Synthesis”. Revus, 2003, no. 1, p. 58.
5 A joke has a circulation that even the jungle has a constitution, which consists of two articles: article 1 
states that the lion is always right, and article 2 that if the lion is not right, see article 1. This is what a perfectly 
minimalist constitution is, which encapsulates all three types of H. L. A. Hart’s secondary rules. But a minimalist 
constitution is still a constitution.
6 See, e.g., T. Ginsburg, T. Moustafa. Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
7 On the webpage of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (more known as the Venice 
Commission): World Conference of Constitutional Justice – 112 members! http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/
pages/?p=02_WCCJ&lang=EN (accessed on 29 June 2018). Update-note after the submission of the article: One more 
member is expected to join as of 1 December 2018, (ibid.; accessed on 16 October 2018).
8 Assessment by Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis. https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (accessed on 29 June 2018).
9 Assessment by Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2018: Table of Country Scores. https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores) (accessed on 29 June 2018). Of 47 member States of the 
Council of Europe eight are designated as partly free and 3 as not free.




ttOTRqQkQ5TkNzWGNtRlowQTZ0UzlUK0pDdm9PVGlcLyJ9 (accessed on 29 June 2018). 20 polities are 
designated as full democracies, and 57 as flawed democracies. Of the surveyed (not all) member States of the Council 
of Europe, 14 are designated as full democracies, 18 as flawed democracies, 7 as hybrid regimes and 2 as 
authoritarian.
11 The next (5th) Congress of the World Conference will be held, in 2020, in the country designated in the 
above-cited rankings as not free and authoritarian. Note 7 supra.
UNED. Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, núm. 42, 2018, pp. 131-159
 ON THE RULE OF LAW AND THE QUALITY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF THE … 133
it must not be overestimated too. Hierarchy is not a goal of itself: constitutionalism is 
inherently linked to liberty, human rights and regime’s legitimation.12
My other hat, i.e. my mission of the judge of the Strasbourg Court, is to contribute 
to the international protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms13 enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols.14 The Convention is a legal 
order different from a constitution (despite some similarities). It has been labelled as the 
“constitutional instrument of European public order”.15 This functionalist utterance has 
inspired assertions that the Court should become, or already is, a “European constitu-
tional court”.16 The law of the Convention, as judicially enforced by the Court, indeed 
has a potential to constitute the substratum for a vital (and widening) segment of Euro-
pean public order; but even if one accepts that transnational constitutionalism is “desir-
able” and “emerges as entirely plausible” to “its nation-state counterpart”, this does not 
imply that the Convention is a “transnational regime that can be persuasively character-
ised as constitutional and consistent with the ideal of constitutionalism”,17 let alone that 
the Strasbourg Court is a constitutional court. Such equation would beg the question as 
to what constitution that constitutional court represents. The ability of the Convention 
to underlie part of European public order is of a different nature than the founding 
authority of constitution proper. The rationale of the latter lies in the same legal order’s 
hierarchy based on Grundnorm; and that of the Convention in the High Parties’ commit-
ment to it as an international instrument, which fixes certain rights that comprise the 
core of the Parties’ common legal heritage, with its accentuation of individual liberty, 
and merits international judicial protection.18 This falls short of formal hierarchy. The 
12 “[W]e conflate two norms when speaking of the rule of law. The first is that powers … shall rule by, and 
themselves obey, enacted general rules, and that they shall change their policies by changing those rules rather than 
by arbitrary deviations for or against particular persons. The second is that there is a core of individual human rights 
inherent in law itself, so that the rule of law must include the protection of these rights.” M. Shapiro. “Courts in 
Authoritarian Regimes”. In: T. Ginsburg, T. Moustafa. Op. cit., note 6 supra, p. 329. “In liberal constitutional 
thought, the question of the rightness of the fundamental-legal regime is primary.” N. Dmitrijević. “Constitu-
tional Democracy, or how to Prevent the Rule of the People”. In: A. Sajó (ed.). Out and Into Authoritarian Law. The 
Hague: Kluwer, 2003, p. 79.
13 For the sake of convenience, in the ensuing narrative I omit “and freedoms”.
14 Again, for the sake of convenience, I omit “and its Protocols”.
15 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) ([GC], no. 15318/89, § 75, 23 March 1995). This has been 
repeated in a number of judgments, the last ones (at the time of writing of this article) by the Grand Chamber being 
Avotiņš v. Latvia ([GC], no. 17502/07, §§ 101, 112 and 116, 23 May 2016) and Al-Dulimi and Montana Management 
Inc. v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 5809/08, § 145, 21 June 2016).
16 See, e.g.: G. Ulfstein. “The European Court of Human Rights as a Constitutional Court?”. PluriCourts 
Research Paper no. 14-08, 2014; P. Pinto de Albuquerque. “The Constitutionalisation of the Legal Order of the 
Council of Europe”. In: I. Motoc, P. Pinto de Albuquerque, K. Wojtyczek (eds). New Developments in Constitutional 
Law: Essays in Honour of András Sajó. The Hague: Eleven, 2018.
17 M. Rosenfeld. “Transnational Constitutionalism and Legal Cultural Pluralism”. In: I. Motoc, P. Pinto 
de Albuquerque, K. Wojtyczek (eds). Op. cit., note 16 supra, pp. 383, 386–388.
18 The question, however, remains as to what is common in that heritage. The wider the variety of legal 
institutions, the less commonness can be expected to be found (especially in view of the divergence between the con-
tinental and the Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, but also of very different historical experiences of many continental 
countries). It is tempting to reduce the search for commonness to the sphere of constitutionalism and to see its core 
in the two principles: free elections and constitutional protection of fundamental rights elements (see, e.g., D. Rous-
seau. “The Concept of European Constitutional Heritage”. In: The Constitutional Heritage of Europe. Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 1997, p. 21). But such approach can be countered by pointing to the fact that several 
member States of the Council of Europe are not free, hybrid regimes or authoritarian (notes 9 and 10 supra), as well 
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Convention is not a constitution of any kind, unless this concept becomes inflated. What 
is more, although the Court is entitled to find, by a binding judgment, violations of the 
Convention, it has no authority to invalidate domestic legislation, on which practices 
constituting these violations are based. Not being a negative legislator,19 it does not sat-
isfy the minimal condition for being a constitutional court. Notwithstanding that, one 
must admit that the ceaseless insistence on the Court’s equation with constitutional 
courts has rendered this belief almost fait accompli;20 analytical objections to it are less 
and less taken into account.
Like constitutional courts, born from the need to ensure the hierarchy of the legal 
order, are no panacea for ensuring that law reigns, for a court being not a constitutional 
court is no fault in the eyes of the rule of law. The fact that the Strasbourg Court is not 
a constitutional court in no way abates its possibilities to positively impact on the qual-
ity of the law and, consequently, its role of the guardian and promoter of the rule of law.
II. TOWARDS THE COMMON CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW
In about mid-12th century the development of law in the West produced an 
unprecedented phenomenon: Western legal tradition, identified by the following traits: 
legal institutions are analytically distinct and autonomous from (though influenced by) 
other types of institutions (religion, politics, morality, custom); law is administered by 
a corps of people, engaged in legal activity on a professional basis as a more or less full-
time occupation; legal institutions, which would otherwise be disparate and unorgan-
ised, are conceptualised and systematised through meta-law, as elaborated in learned 
treatises and classrooms of law schools, which allows for their analysis and evaluation; 
law is conceived to be an integrated system (corpus juris), whose vitality is ensured by the 
belief in its ongoing character and capacity for organic change, subject to its internal 
logic, requiring that it changes not adapting at random to new conditions, but respond-
ing to an inner necessity for reflection and reinterpretation of the past to meet future 
needs; diverse jurisdictions co-exist and compete within the same community, and this 
renders the tradition pluralist; law is supreme over political authorities, as the latter may 
make law, but may not make it arbitrarily, and until law has been remade, they are 
bound by it; the perennial tension between the ideals and realities has periodically led to 
violent overthrows of the existing legal systems by revolution, but they resulted in the 
tradition becoming even stronger.21 The idea of supremacy of law over political (and 
other) authorities (and the idea of human rights too) has evolved out of the Western legal 
as to the fact that so-called Eastern and Western judges of the Strasbourg Court have brought a “different perception 
to human rights” (N.-L. Arold. The Legal Culture of the European Court of Human Rights. Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 69 et seq.).
19 Constitutional courts are necessarily Kelsenian negative legislators. This prerequisite, however, does not 
prevent the rising trend of them acting as de facto positive legislators too. A. R. Brewer-carías. Constitutional 
Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Law Study. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
20 B. Zupančić. Op. cit., note 4 supra, p. 59.
21 Here I refer, in a truncated form, to H. J. Berman, the unsurpassed authority in this field of research, who 
in the 1960s coined the very term “Western legal tradition”, and in particular to his magnum opus: H. J. Berman. 
Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge MA/London, 1983.
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tradition.22 This idea is the starting point for understanding what is referred to as the 
rule of law.
Through the colonisation of the rest of the world the West imposed its institutions 
on other civilisations, which (even if having undergone certain transformations) became 
widely assimilated. Those other civilisations absorbed the view that law is an integrated 
system and that it is superior to political authorities. The rule of law has become an offi-
cial parlance even in those polities, where it is only a façade. Dictatorships’ resort to such 
camouflage also signifies the idea’s moral strength. Mention should also be made of 
international law, which (though often blatantly disregarded) is crucial for holding 
international relations harmonious. The Western legal tradition is a factor promoting 
international integration and globalisation, inter alia, via the United Nations or such 
regional formations as the European Union or the Council of Europe.23
It has been asserted that the Western legal tradition is facing a crisis, as only a few 
(even a minority) of its above-mentioned traits have been still truly inherent in the 
Western law, namely: relative autonomy; cultivation by legal professionals; flourishing 
of law training centres; and development of meta-law. Other traits allegedly have been 
affected by erosion: law has been less and less conceived as a coherent whole (with an 
inherent hierarchy of its sources); its growth through reinterpretation has been increas-
ingly held to be an ideological illusion; changes in law have been viewed as resulting not 
from the internal logic of its growth, but rather due to the pressure of outside forces; the 
view that law is superior to politics has yielded to the view that it is mere means of effec-
tuating the will of those exercising political authority; the pluralism of law has been 
considerably weakened by the tendency “to swallow up all the diverse jurisdictions and 
systems in a single central program of legislation and administrative regulation”; the 
belief that the Western legal tradition precedes and survives the great total upheavals 
and thus transcends revolution has been challenged by the belief that law is wholly sub-
ordinate to revolution and that even if the old forms are retained, they are “filled with 
new content”. All this has been accompanied by contempt for and cynicism about law, 
revolt against legal formalism, yielding to public policy needs, and fairness as a legal cat-
egory losing its historical and philosophical roots being “blown about by every wind of 
fashionable doctrine”.24 The crisis of the Western legal tradition would mean also the 
crisis of the rule of law. No one could predict what might come after the rule of law.
22 Berman contended that perhaps the earliest published use of the English expression “rule of law” in the 
sense of “reign of law” was in 1649 by King Charles I during his defence in the Parliament: “power reigns without 
rule of law”. More than two centuries later it was brought into widespread use by A. V. Dicey. H. J. Berman. “The 
Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat): With Special Reference to the Developments in the Soviet 
Union”. The Harriman Institute Forum, 1991, vol. 4, no. 5, p. 2.
23 See, e.g.: D. B. Goldman. Globalisation and the Western Legal Tradition: Recurring Patterns of Law and 
Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; G. Teubner (ed.). Global Law without a State. Aldershot/
Brookfield VT: Dartmouth, 1997; Twining, W. Globalisation and Legal Scholarship. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publish-
ers, 2011.
24 Berman, H. J. Law and Revolution, note 21 supra, pp. 37–41. Two decades later Berman argued that a 
new legal tradition, which he called “the world legal tradition”, was in its formative stages. In his opinion, this new 
tradition was bringing together the diverse legal traditions of various cultures of the world, combining the Western 
legal tradition with that of other cultures, and challenging all of them. Id. “The Western Legal Tradition in a Mil-
lenial Perspective: Past and Future”. Louisiana Law Review, 2000, vol. 60, no. 3. That article was published a year 
before what has become known as 9/11. In one of his last works Berman claimed that the Western legal tradition 
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There are many indications that this apocalyptic scenario is not trivial: economic 
crises, democracy deficit, use of popular vote and technologies for undermining the 
authority of law, populism, radicalism, xenophobia, international conflicts which look 
like harbingers of the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations. They all —each in its own 
way and combined with the rejection of the hierarchical structure of law, quasi-legal 
instruments’ competition with hard law, fragmentation of international law, and inef-
fectiveness of international organisation— challenge the traditional role of law both in 
societies and among them and herald the troubles that the rule of law is likely to undergo 
both as a principle underlying legal systems and as a general idea. One of the aspects of 
the crisis is the tension between the expectations, laid down in law and protected as 
rights, and public authorities’ inability (or unwillingness) to fulfil their commitment to 
ensure these rights. Rights are thought to be trumps,25 but today’s deck of cards has too 
many jokers attempting to trump them.
Courts, by their nature, impede the undermining of the role of law. Not reducing 
themselves to legislator’s mouthpiece, they are portrayed as inherently activist and 
tagged as “courtocracy”, “juristocracy”, “constitutional theocracy”, or “dictatorship of 
black robes”.26 The societal support for this demonising attitude is not inconsiderable 
and has intensified since when the ominous insights about the crisis of the Western legal 
tradition were pronounced in the 1970s. But the pessimistic prophecies are not shared 
by many. Notwithstanding its difficulties, that tradition has a potential of resistance to 
the endeavours to subjugate law to politics or societal pressure. The concerns about the 
crisis were voiced before the breakup of the USSR, which was creating an alternative 
legal tradition, which was capable of playing some role in shattering the foundations of 
its Western competitor, but collapsed itself; and before the advent of EU, whose law 
co-exists and competes with member States’ national and various supranational legal sys-
tems. Resistance potential may also be evoked by the need to withstand the challenges 
of new major international conflicts. More generally, the direction and magnitude of the 
formation and transformation (and demise) of traditions may be reflected on with some 
certainty only from time’s perspective. Although the indications of the crisis must not 
be oversimplified, any conclusions should be based not so much on the quantifiable fac-
tography of manifestations of the neglect of law (e.g., assaults on individual liberty), 
oft-generalised as “the submission of law to politics”, “legal cynicism”, or “displacement 
of legal formalism”, but on the fundamental changes in societies’ belief as to the working 
of law and its role vis-à-vis other institutions. If the Western legal tradition is in crisis, 
the latter would be a phenomenon not of formal legality, but of culture.
Lastly, a crisis per se does not imply a collapse. The rule of law is not always holding 
the field against all sorts of attacks; however, its very idea has not been abandoned, at least 
was “no longer alive and well”. Id. Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the West-
ern Legal Tradition. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 282.
25 Dworkin, R. “Rights as Trumps”. In: J. Waldron (ed.). Theories of Rights. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984.
26 In the article with an emblematic title, one author argues that the notion of the rule of law has been 
changed, inter alia, by transforming the object of legitimacy from a question of power (what the rules do) to a ques-
tion of authority (who appoints the ruler) and by making it equivalent to procedural correctness (one of the the key 
words being judiciary’s independence), thereby reinforcing the role of the judiciary. E. Colombatto. “It Was the 
Rule of Law. Will It be the Rule of Judges?”. Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, no. 6.
UNED. Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, núm. 42, 2018, pp. 131-159
 ON THE RULE OF LAW AND THE QUALITY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF THE … 137
not yet. While it is completely possible that the Western legal tradition will undergo 
essential transformation, it is also possible that it will revive and strengthen, like after 
previous major upheavals, and “instead of [its] prophesied end ... we will see only the 
beginning of a new stage in its development”.27 Unless this transformation throws over-
board the rule of law, the tradition will persist. Courts, both national and international, 
play a crucial role in this —also by filling the idea of the rule of law with concrete 
contents.
“Rule of law” is translated to German as Rechtsstaat and to French as État de droit, 
i.e. law-governed (or law-based) state. On the continent, an equivalent of the German/
French term is used in many languages. These are not mere lingual peculiarities.28 The 
two concepts have common elements, but are not identical. Rechtsstaat is incident to con-
tinental Europe (and countries that have taken over the logic and culture of continental 
law) and is said to comprise the minimum of the rule of law and thus to be a narrower 
concept. It implies that the sovereign is bound by law as long as it has not been changed, 
but is not precluded from changing even its cornerstones. The autonomy of law from 
politics thus depends on political authorities’ will and/or ability to change the founda-
tions of law. In a democracy, this autonomy may be overridden, if authorities’ intention 
to make a change is supported or even urged by the electorate.
The Anglo-Saxon concept of the rule of law (typical of Britain and countries that 
have taken over her legal experience) does not allow even the sovereign to intervene in 
the law as he wishes. Some rights are considered inalienable and override his will, even 
where it reflects general consensus. This implies some higher standards, not lending 
themselves to intervention initiated by political authority or spurred by societal pres-
sure. They emanate not from positive law as law-makers’ will, but from a competing 
source, whatever it may be: religion, morality, human nature, perception of justice, 
nation’s spirit etc. Since they limit law-makers’ discretion, they must themselves be part 
of law, although not that posited by legislator, i.e. not positive law. Legal philosophies 
diverge as to the nature of these standards; not entering into this debate, it must be said 
that law-makers’ arbitrariness has not been advocated even by positivism, which does 
not agree that these standards are of legal nature: while accepting no legal restrictions on 
the sovereign’s law-making power, it makes no attempt to justify immoral or unfair law. 
Its Kelsenian version holds that Rechtsstaat is a tautology, because a state is able of 
expressing its will only in the form of law, hence, any state is governed by law; but this 
analysis is not meant to comfort legal practices of regimes professing contempt for moral 
precepts, including those which would fetter law-makers’ will and render it not law.
The geographical dimension of the rule of law–Rechtsstaat divide, manifesting the 
difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental viewpoints, must not be over-
rated. In the British tradition legislator-made law has a competitor in the body of law, 
made by courts in the course of application of not only laws, but also concepts of justice, 
customs, and general principles of law, not set in laws and even overriding them. But 
positivism anchored itself in legal thought due to thinkers cultivated in namely that 
27 Machovenko, J. Teisės istorija [Legal History]. Vilnius: Registrų centras, 2013, p. 33.
28 Cf. Venice Commission’s Report on the Rule of Law, 25–26 March 2011, CDL-AD (2011) 003rev. See (also 
on the differences within the Anglo-Saxon and the continental concepts), e.g., E. O. Wennerström. The Rule of 
Law and the European Union. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2007, p. 61 et seq.
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tradition, such as Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, or H. L. A. Hart. Also, in 19th century 
the United States Supreme Court invoked the procedural potential of constitutionalism 
and assumed the role of constitutional court. Hans Kelsen, the European mover of con-
stitutional courts as a sub-branch of the judiciary, had rationalised what already existed, 
in a different institutional setting, outside the continental tradition.29 His model, in 
which constitutional courts can override legislators’ enactments, was taken over by many 
polities in, but also outside Europe. Also, some of the strongest criticisms of the real state 
of law and its claims to reign originated not in legal cultures once comfortable with pos-
itivism and Rechtsstaat, rather than the broader meaning of the rule of law, but in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. In the 1970s the United States begot the pretentious Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, which not only vividly portrays inconsistencies of law as it is (the 
force of many of their assessments must be admitted), but also tends to trumpet these 
criticisms into a generalised repudiation of law as a mere offspring of power (politics, 
religion, ideology etc.) and thus to nothing more than a deceit, which must be decon-
structed, dethroned, “thrashed”. While this negativist attitude was gaining momentum 
in the United States, Europe underwent new inflows of constitutional justice.
Nowadays, the divide discussed here has diminished in importance. The two con-
cepts are still distinguished analytically, but they have converged both at the level of 
ideas and in the real operation of law. Rechtsstaat has been interpreted in an increasingly 
expansive manner to require that legislators abide by such tenets as inalienability of 
human rights and good governance, implying substantive and procedural requirements 
for law-making, even if not fixed in any statute. To counteract the positivist concern that 
such tenets could be legally binding, only if they themselves are of legal nature, constitu-
tional courts have detected them in constitutions. For all practical purposes, the criteria 
of lawfulness of positive law thus no longer stem from some difficult-to-grasp supra-le-
gal realm (on whose nature and mode of imposition on the positive law a debate will go 
on till doomsday), but from a constitution —a Rousseaesque contrat social with its con-
notation of natural justice, but also the supreme act of positive law. The detection has 
been easy where a constitution explicitly mentions the rule of law (or law-governed 
state); but courts have not shied away from it also where there is no such mentioning, 
their task being relieved by the fact that many requirements directly enshrined in mod-
ern constitutions have clear rule of law connotations and lend themselves to interpreta-
tion as its instances, such as prospectivity and accessibility of law; access to justice before 
independent and impartial courts; equality before the law; respect for human rights; 
compliance with international law etc. Attribution of legal nature to the rule of law 
marks the passage from formalist to substantive constitutionalism, and from constitu-
tion’s letter to spirit. The latter term of art, despite its arcane naming, is a worldly, oper-
ational concept, which courts have interpreted with sufficient concreteness. Letter still 
matters, but yields to spirit; formalism has not been rejected, but rules do not reign over 
principles. Constitutional justice thus has contributed tangibly to Rechtsstaat’s approxi-
mation to the rule of law and, more generally, to conceiving law as not an axiomatic, but 
a jurisprudential, arguable phenomenon, which is not confined to what has been deter-
mined by legislator, but embraces judge-made law and progresses through application 
29 A. R. Brewer-carías. Op. cit., note 19 supra, p. 9.
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of concepts of justice and general principles of law, conceptualised in legal thought (but 
not necessarily mentioned in laws). It is said that the constitution is what judges say it 
is; in a similar vein, the rule of law is what courts say it is. This is a descriptive, not pre-
scriptive statement; realism, not positivism. And the reality is that whereas in a national 
legal system one (constitutional) court resolves what the constitution of that country is, 
the rule of law is a shared idea, not monopolised by any single legal order and interpreted 
in parallel by many national and international courts. None of them has the final say: they 
all contribute to revealing and advancing the contents of this concept.
There rub is: how to reconcile an arguable character of law and the rule of law?30 As 
said above, courts are no panacea for ensuring the reign of law. There have been prevar-
icating, cowardly or simply unfair judicial decisions in many jurisdictions, korematsus,31 
which courts, with hindsight, would like to see deleted from their history. How can one 
ensure that the judicial interpretation of law is transparent and not arbitrary? Courts’ 
authority to determine the meaning of the rule of law per se does not imply that what 
they argue about it tallies with its intrinsic meaning, i.e. that that meaning, formal obei-
sance to the rule of law being made, is not distorted on political orders, under societal 
pressure, or even on a whim. Their authority to determine the meaning of the rule of law 
signifies, in practice, that meaning’s advantage over all others, whoever their authors 
may be (even sovereigns), and disregarding that, prior to courts’ interpreting anew some 
element of the rule of law, there might have prevailed its alternative perception, under-
lying respective practices and even approved by courts themselves. For a realist, this 
implies that courts are in fact superior to the rule of law itself. The latter would be difficult 
to validate in normative (legal or moral) terms and would pour water on the mill of 
“courtocracy”. On the other hand, if there may be an intrinsic meaning of the rule of law 
superior to what courts may have erroneously interpreted, this would render that mean-
ing mystical, devoid of that tangibility which already has been imparted on it by the 
collective working of courts.
The arsenal of safeguards against the judicial distortion of the hypothetical intrinsic 
meaning of the rule of law is meagre. In Europe one such safeguard against its distortion 
by national courts might be the Strasbourg Court, which, as an international body, is 
thought to be less prone to some of the pressures and more apt than domestic courts to 
interpret the rule of law in the light of common legal and cultural heritage (the fact that 
it is not financially independent is almost never discussed). However, this safeguard is 
not cast-iron, as there is no guarantee that the Strasbourg Court will not itself distort the 
intrinsic meaning of rule of law.
The relation between the meaning of the rule of law and its judicial interpretation is 
not the one of supremacy, but of the moral legitimacy of courts’ decisions.32 Questioning that 
30 N. MacCormick. Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010, pp. 14–16.
31 I refer, in the appellative sense, to Korematsu v. United States (323 U.S. 214 (1944)), the US Supreme Court 
case concerning the constitutionality of the executive order, which called for internment of Americans of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II, regardless of citizenship. The Supreme Court by 6 votes to 3 upheld the order as 
constitutional.
32 K. E. Himma. “What Exactly is the Problem with Judicial Supremacy?” The Rule of Law, Moral Legiti-
macy, and the Construction of Constitutional Law. In: M. Jovanović, K. E. Himma (eds.). Courts, Interpretation, the 
Rule of Law. The Hague: Eleven, 2014, pp. 18–32.
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legitimacy may lead us out from world of law back to the initial aporia of the nature of the 
highest criteria of lawfulness of positive law (which courts have overcome by adopting the 
view that these criteria are to be found in constitutions). This risk is pragmatically avoided 
by realistically accepting (regardless of how one views realism as a methodology) that the 
meaning of the rule of law is determined by courts, and if they err, their moral critique can-
not be rebutted as illegitimate on the sole ground that it rests on non-legal bedrock. Jus-
tice is not limited to justice under law (after all, most people are not lawyers, but seek 
justice). Justice is an essentially contested concept.33 Intellectual exercise in revealing the 
allegedly true essence of such concepts is thought-stimulating. But all efforts to shell out 
the practicable meaning of the rule of law, other than the one laid down in judicial doc-
trines, so far have not abandoned the realm of speculation. If there are theoreticians who 
can square this circle convincingly and authoritatively (and not only with full inner confi-
dence), I have not met any. “Rule of law” is a term of art, for which no one has been able of 
giving a single comprehensive definition.34
“Rule of law” allegedly has become a hurrah-word, exploited by all sorts of radi-
cals, centre liberals and conservatives.35 It may be employed for criticising virtually 
any policy or legal practice. Billpostings of indications of defiance of law (they can be 
recorded in any state) are used for claiming that a state is not governed by law. The 
rule of law thereby turns into a rhetorical cliché instrumentalised in political struggle. 
But ideals, as per definition, are not achievable. The rule of law is not attainable in its 
perfection. Deviation of legal practices from its standards does not, in itself, warrant a 
generalised labelling of a state as not being governed by law. The notion of the rule of 
law is meant not to define an ideal, but to provide guidelines for improvements based 
on the assessment of concrete defects. Whether a case meets the standards of the rule 
of law and, more broadly, whether a state is governed by law, rests on the well-known 
formula “I know it when I see it”, where the criterion of divide is the contrast between 
the rule of law and arbitrary power.36 It thus suffices to verify the few main themes of 
the latter: government limited by law; formal legality; and the rule of law, not man.37 
This open-ended description calls for specification —which, however, is encumbered 
by the conceptual divide between Rechtsstaat’s formalism and the substantivity of the 
broader meaning of the rule of law.
The two approaches focus on, respectively, the form of positive law and its substance. 
The gist of the formalist theories is that the rule of law means “literally what it says”, i.e. 
33 In the sense from the outset attributed to this category. See W. B. Gallie. “Essentially Contested Con-
cepts”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1956, vol. 56, issue 1. On “justice” and “rule of law” as essentially con-
tested concepts see, e.g., D. Collier, F. Daniel, A. O. Maciuseanu. “Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and 
Applications”. Journal of Political Ideologies, 2006, vol. 11, no. 3.
34 D. M. Beatty. The Ultimate Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. vi.
35 C. Sampford. Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 39.
36 M. Krygier. “False Dichotomies, True Perplexities, and the Rule of Law”. In: A. Sajó (ed.). Human Rights 
with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 255–256. Here is 
another example of “simple” definition of the rule of law by the same author: “At a bare minimum, the point of the 
rule of law … is relatively simple: all actors should be constrained by, and people should be able to rely on, the law 
when they act.” Id. “The Quality of Civility: Post-Anti-Communist Thoughts on Civil Society and the Rule of 
Law”. In A. Sajó (ed.). Out and into Authoritarian Law, note 12 supra, p. 249.
37 B. Tamanaha. On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004, pp. 114–126.
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“the rule of the law”,38 or even that “the rule of law is a law of rules”.39 Such utterings, 
witty though they seem, are trite. There cannot be a rule of law without rules of law, and 
only law consisting of rules can be certain and predictable.40 Substantivist theories assert 
that, in order there to be the rule of law, law should establish (social) justice, including 
“fair” distribution of public goods. To define the rule of law, already a problematic 
notion, they import several other essentially contested concepts: “justice”, “fairness” and 
“public goods”. This only complicates the matter.
Both camps further differentiate into thin(ner) and thick(er) theories.41 The thin 
ones are more functional and procedural; the thick ones more substantive.42 What for 
the thin theories is “rule-by-law”, for the thick ones “individual rights”. Moving in 
the direction of greater thickness of both types of theories, the same goes for “formal 
legality” and “right of dignity and/or justice”; and “democracy + legality” and “social 
welfare”.43 The most extreme of the thick theories equate law-governed state with 
social/welfare state, thereby leaching out the rule of law of its legal core and rendering 
it an ideological parlance. Yet, the rule of law “cannot be about everything good that 
people desire from government”.44 This would imply that states encountering major 
economic difficulties may not be treated as being governed by law, because they are 
unable of ensuring welfare. Law-governed state’s fusion with social/welfare state would 
render the Strasbourg Court’s case-law on standards of the rule of law (in particular 
regarding non-derogable rights) in times of crises45 irrational. Also, economy may 
develop fast, and welfare may be ensured under dictatorial regimes too. Although the 
importance of the rule of law is recognised for virtually all areas of life, including eco-
nomic progress, the significance of law for economics should not be exaggerated. Even 
less it is permissible to equate the rule of law and economic progress (welfare).46 Like 
legal formalism per se is not the necessary, let alone determining part of social insensi-
tivity, social justice programmes are to be assessed on their own merits, to which legal 
argument may bring only some extra savour.
It is tempting to derive the rule of law–Rechtsstaat divide (and their differentia-
tion into thin and thick theories) from the antagonism between positivism and natu-
ral law theory. In fact, that divide does not prevent the two great theories from 
meeting on the field of the rule of law. Some positivists (Friedrich von Hayek, Joseph 
Raz) are deemed as “moralising” for attribution to the rule of law of certain moral 
principles. It thus makes sense to classify as thick and thin not all theories, but only 
38 J. Raz. “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue”. Law Quarterly Review, 1977, vol. 93, no. 1, p. 196.
39 A. Scalia. “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules”. University of Chicago Law Review, 1989, vol. 56, no. 3, p. 1175.
40 N. MacCormick, N. Op. cit., note 30 supra, p. 12.
41 C. Sampford. Op. cit., note 35 supra, pp. 45–55. For more on this divide see: S. Kirchin. (ed.). Thick 
Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; B. Williams. Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. On the application of this distinction to the notion of the rule of law, see: A. Hutchinson, P. Mona-
han. The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology. Toronto: Carswell, 1987, p. 101. 
42 K. E. Himma. Op. cit., note 30 supra, pp. 13–18.
43 B. Tamanaha. Op. cit., note 37 supra, pp. 91–113.
44 Ibid., p. 113.
45 See, e.g., L.-A. Sicilianos. “The European Court of Human Rights at Time of Crisis in Europe”. European 
Human Rights Law Review, 2016, issue 2.
46 F. K. Upham. “The Illusory Promise of the Rule of Law”. In: A. Sajó (ed.). Human Rights with Modesty, 
note 36 supra, p. 279.
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those that moralise,47 for those which do not assert any moral principles and completely 
detach law from morals (like Kelsen’s normativism) are so thin that, for the purposes of 
postulating the elements of the rule of law, they are devoid of potential. The remaining 
thin and thick theories from both camps recognise the significance of human rights, 
which renders their opposition relative. And the elements of the rule of law that positiv-
ism is armed with have been worked out by Lon L. Fuller, a protagonist of natural law.
Fuller asked: when would it be possible to hold that there is no rule of law in a 
hypothetical state governed by a monarch? and came up with the answer, that it would 
be so, if that monarch: 
 i)  tries to make special rules for everyone to suit their particular needs, but this 
only arouses confusion and anger at differential treatment; 
 ii)  fails to publicise them, so nobody knows what laws to follow; 
 iii)  makes all his laws retroactive; 
 iv)  enacts vague or obscure rules; 
 v)  enacts rules that contradict each other; 
 vi)  enacts rules that could not be followed; 
 vii)  fails to apply rules consistently; 
viii)  changes his laws so often that his subjects cannot rely on them to plan their 
actions.48
Such law would be immoral. The reverse are the standards of the rule of law, or its 
elements. Their necessity springs from the internal morality of law.
Abundant theorisings about the standards of the rule of law and constructs of the 
rule of law as an operational category, whatever their merits, often are but variations of 
Fuller’s sketch.49 According to Tom Bingham, the rule of law must satisfy the following 
prerequisites (“ingredients”): 
 i)  law (including judge-made law) must be accessible, predictable, as far as pos-
sible intelligible and clear; 
 ii)   discretion has to be limited in that sense that questions of rights should be 
resolved by the application of law and not by the exercise of discretion; 
 iii)  persons have to be equal before the law, and differentiated legal regulation 
allowed only if objective differences so require; 
 iv)  public officials must exercise their powers in good faith, fairly, only for the 
purpose for which these powers were conferred, without exceeding their limit, 
and not unreasonably; 
 v)  human rights must be respected; 
 vi)  means must be provided to resolve, without prohibitive cost or inordinate 
delay, bona fide disputes; 
47 M. Neumann. “The Rule of Law: Politicizing Ethics”. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, pp. 2–3.
48 L. L. Fuller. The Morality of Law (rev edn). New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1964.
49 See, e.g.: A. Marmor. “The Rule of Law and Its Limits”. Law and Philosophy, 2004, vol. 23, no. 1; M. J. 
Radin. “ Reconsidering the Rule of Law”. Boston University Law review, 1989, vol. 69, no. 4; J. Raz. The Authority 
of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (2nd edn). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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 vii)  fair trial must be guaranteed; 
viii)  compliance with international law should be ensured.50
These elements, conceptualised in theory, are present in modern constitutions 
(often along with the explicit mentioning of the rule of law). They have been consoli-
dated in the Venice Commission’s 2011 Report on the Rule of Law,51 which attempts to 
reconcile different notions of the rule of law. Bingham’s list of eight “ingredients” has 
been reworked and reduced to six: 
 i)  legality, including a transparent, accountable and democratic process for 
enacting law; 
 ii)  legal certainty; 
 iii)  prohibition of arbitrariness; 
 iv)  access to justice before independent and impartial courts, including judicial 
review of administrative acts; 
 v)  respect for human rights; 
 vi)  non-discrimination and equality before the law.
Notwithstanding its merits, the list is debatable. In particular, the fifth “ingredi-
ent” overlaps with all others. Distinguishing legality as a separate “ingredient” is also 
misleading, because legality rightly is the central element of the rule of law,52 and thus 
must be considered as an inherent dimension of all other “ingredients”. For instance, 
what lacks legal certainty or is arbitrary should not be considered as lawful and thus as 
“legal”. On that account, Fuller’s eight elements (and Bingham’s eight “ingredients”) 
can be presented in the following way: 
 i)  generality (there must be rules which are “more than patternless exercises of 
political power); 
 ii)  promulgation of laws; 
 iii)  prohibition of retroactivity (with some exceptions aimed at interpretation or 
curing irregularities of form); 
 iv)  clarity (sufficient precision); 
 v)  absence of conflicting provisions; 
 vi)  not requiring impossible; 
 vii)  stability (changes must be not frequent); 
viii)  congruence between official acts and declared rules.53
But the Report, as soft law, was not meant to please an academic taste. It is geared 
to practical needs: to reinforce the notion of the rule of law as an operational category, to 
provide guidelines for legislation and law-application, and to facilitate judicial 
50 Bingham, T. The Rule of Law. London: Penguin Books, 2010.
51 Note 28 supra.
52 Lautenbach, G. The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p. 37 et seq.
53 Ibid., pp. 38–39.
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application of the standards of the rule of law. Although unfolding the substance of the 
rule of law, as a constitutional concept, is the task of constitutional courts, none of them 
is fully free in this activity: they must take account of the shared idea of the rule of law 
as part of common heritage.
The above-indicated standards are subject to fine-tuning. Let us, by way of exam-
ple, have a closer look at one of the “ingredients”: the prospectivity of law (inherently 
related to its predictability and legal certainty). As a matter of principle, retroactive 
legislation may be held to be not law at all, because it is factually not possible to reg-
ulate the past. But prospectivity is not superior to other standards of the rule of law; 
it must not create an illusion that perfect predictability of law is achievable.54 For 
example, Article 7 of the Convention prohibits retroactive legislation in rather abso-
lute terms in the context of criminal proceedings, but allows for an exception: this 
prohibition “shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”. The imperative of prospec-
tivity must be accommodated to real-life situations, where blind toothing to the letter 
of law may bring about the dysfunction of the whole system. Pereat mundus, fiat iustitia; 
but what is iustitia worth, if mundus periit? When faced with major crises, authorities 
resort to retroactive (retrospective) law-making; they do this also for the benefit of the 
addressees of prior legislation. To provide one example, the Strasbourg Court dis-
misses applications on the ground that retroactive legislation has been introduced, 
providing for new domestic remedies that must be exhausted before applying to this 
Court,55 or domestic courts have interpreted the old law anew so that it is now deemed 
as providing such remedies.56 Justifiable deviations from the general prospectivity 
imperative include, inter alia, curative, restorative, validating, beneficial and proce-
dural legislation, as well as legislation specifying statutes of limitation or providing 
for new remedies.57 Judicial practice benefits from academic systematisations and con-
ceptualisations, but also verifies and corrects them. Lenience to some types of retroac-
tivity provides no safe umbrella for every single instance of retroactive law-making, 
which nominally falls into one of the exceptions. Their application is challengeable.58 
Predictability rules, even if not absolutely.
54 C. Sampford. Op. cit., note 35 supra, p. 47.
55 Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey (no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012). After the application of the pilot judgment 
procedure a new domestic remedy has been established in Turkey, which was capable of offering a reasonable pros-
pect of redress for complaints concerning the length of proceedings. The Court continued with the examination of 
applications of the same type which were already communicated to the Government; others were dismissed on the 
ground that the applicants had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies.
56 Savickas and Others v. Lithuania ((dec.), nos. 66365/09, 12845/10, 28367/11, 29809/10, 29813/10 and 
30623/10, 15 October 2013).
57 C. Sampford. Op. cit., note 35 supra, pp. 103–164. To justify them, a range of arguments is used: the nec-
essary evil argument; the better rule argument; the better institution argument; the efficiency argument; the fair-
ness argument. Ibid., pp. 229–256.
58 Cf., e.g., cases where so-called interpretive regulation has been enacted supposedly clarifying the provi-
sions of the previous regulation, yet, in fact, changing that regulation essentially and thereby interfering into the 
cases already pending before courts. Stefanetti and Others v. Italy (nos. 21838/10, 21849/10, 21852/10, 21860/10, 
21869/10 and 21870/10, 14 April 2014); Azienda Agricola Silverfunghi S.a.s. v. Italy (nos. 48357/07, 56277/07, 
52687/07 and 52701/07, 24 June 2014).
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III.  QUALITY OF THE LAW AS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE RULE  
OF LAW
The Statute of the Council of Europe refers to the rule of law twice: in the Preamble, 
where the signatory Governments affirm their devotion to the rule of law, and in Article 3, 
which provides that “every member … must accept the principles of the rule of law”. In the 
Convention, the reference is made once: in the Preamble.59 The Court has expressed its con-
viction that the signatory Governments had the “profound belief in the rule of law”.60 The 
drafters of the Convention saw the rule of law as an inherent part of the common heritage of 
the democratic States that formed the Council of Europe, tacitly leaving it to the Strasbourg 
Court to develop the concept further.61 In the Court’s case-law the rule of law has acquired 
the weight of a general principle, which must be taken into consideration when examining 
all complaints within the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction, in the light of which provisions 
of the Convention are interpreted and applied,62 although the Court was not intended to be 
a court of the rule of law (consequently, not an equivalent of a constitutional court as a neg-
ative legislator), but one of human rights. Such development, however, is natural, because in 
the Western legal tradition the rule of law and human rights are intrinsically interwoven.
As said above, the idea of the rule of law is not monopolised by any single legal 
order and is collectively interpreted by many courts. As a general principle, whose cen-
tral element is legality, it covers all spheres of life, capable of being regulated by law. 
There may be no legal regulation, exempt from control in respect of its compliance with 
this standard. In this regard, the Convention’s parallel with a constitution is appropri-
ate. A constitution is integral; it has no gaps in that (Kelsenian) sense that, for the pur-
poses of constitutional review, there can be no areas where legality rests and it cannot be 
tested whether certain act or decision is in compliance with the constitution. The oppo-
site would imply a constitutionally-approved domain of legitimate arbitrariness. The 
Convention, however,  gaps. It focuses on one, even if wide, segment of social reality: 
human rights. Other segments are outside its ambit. This results in dismissal, by the 
Court, of complaints concerning alleged violations of rights belonging to these other 
areas as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. The sphere 
of application of the rule of law as a constitutional principle is wider than that of its 
application as of a conventional principle. National rule of law doctrines tend to be 
holistic; the Court’s doctrine particularistic. But the Convention is a living instrument, 
whose interpretation by the Court evolves “towards the moral truth of the [Convention] 
rights”.63 As time goes by, its case-law may occupy new areas in two ways: a right not 
59 The term has not been translated into all languages of member States literally. Its equivalent in French is 
prééminence du droit, literally “primacy of law”. This term has been officially translated in my native Lithuanian as 
“teisės viršenybė”, i.e. “supremacy of law”, but in the domestic legal discourse two other terms are used perhaps even 
more often: “teisinė valstybė” (literally “legal state”) and “teisės viešpatavimas” (literally “the reign of law”).
60 Golder v. the United Kingdom (no. 441/70, § 34, 21 February 1975).
61 P. Lemmens. “The Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to the Rule of Law”. In: G. De 
Baere, J. Wouters (eds). The Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law. Chelten-
ham/Northampton MA, 2015, pp. 231-232.
62 Ibid., p. 241.
63 G. Letsas. A Theory of the Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 79.
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guaranteed by the Convention may be protected and defended by invoking other Arti-
cles, which cover its (or related right’s) implementation;64 or the Article may be inter-
preted expansively, so that the right enshrined in it widens in content.65 But even such 
expansion will always have its limits.
It is not easy to formulate a concise academic definition of the rule of law, other 
than indication of its opposition to arbitrariness, but it would be even more difficult to 
define it in a court’s judgment. The essence of the Court’s rule of law doctrine is con-
tained in this apt sentence: “The Court cannot accept that a decision-making power by 
the executive to detain the applicant on the basis of perceived fears of future non-violent 
criminal conduct unrelated to his original murder conviction accords with the spirit of 
the Convention, with its emphasis on the rule of law and protection from arbitrari-
ness.”66 The rule of law thus is conceived as the opposite of arbitrariness and part of the spirit 
of the Convention.
Like constitutional justice has contributed to Rechtsstaat’s approximation to the rule 
of law by crystallising the criteria for telling the contrast between the rule of law and arbi-
trary power, so has the Strasbourg Court’s case-law. None of the Articles of the Convention 
uses the word “arbitrary”, but all the articles that enshrine respective rights have an in-built 
64 For instance, the right to health is not as such among those guaranteed under the Convention (Dossi and 
Others v. Italy ((dec.), no. 26053/07, 12 October 2010). Member States have, parallel to their positive obligations 
under Article 2, a positive obligation under its Article 8, firstly, to have in place regulations compelling both public 
and private hospitals to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ physical integrity, and, sec-
ondly, to provide victims of medical negligence with access to proceedings in which they could, where appropriate, 
obtain compensation for damage (Trocellier v. France ((dec.), no. 75725/01, 5 October 2006; Codarcea v. Romania, 
no. 31675/04, § 103, 2 June 2009; Jurica v. Croatia, no. 30376/13, § 84, 2 May 2017). Health and health care-re-
lated cases (including alleged abuses in the health care institutions), therefore, are not rare, but are examined under 
other Articles (2, 6, 8 or even 9 or 14) (see, among many authorities, Korošec v. Slovenia (no. 77212/12, 8 October 
2015), Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic ([GC], nos. 28859/11 and 28473/12, 15 November 2016; Lopes de 
Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal ([GC], no. 56080/13, 19 December 2017; Carvalho Pinto de Sousa Morais v. Portugal (no. 
17484/15, 25 July 2017; Mockutė v. Lithuania (no. 66490/09, 27 February 2018).
65 To give one example, the Court has interpreted the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 
as encompassing the right for an individual to form and develop relationships with other human beings, including rela-
tionships of a professional or business nature; that Article thus protects the right to personal development and the right 
to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and does not exclude in principle 
activities of professional or business nature, because it is in the course of their working lives that the majority of people 
have a significant opportunity to develop relationships with the outside world (Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 
21722/11, § 165, 9 January 2012). In Erményi v. Hungary (no. 22254/14, 22 November 2016) the Court went further. 
The applicant, who was dismissed from the post of the Vice-President of the Supreme Court, complained under Arti-
cles 6, 13 and 14, but the Court, being “master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case” and 
relying on the jura novit curia principle, requalified his complaint as falling under Article 8. Domestic courts reinstated 
the applicant in his judicial service, but not to his previous administrative position in court system. On this account, 
the Court found a violation of Article 8. It transpires from the judgment that the applicant’s “relationships with the 
outside world”, his social life or even his professional relations were dependent on that post, which was but an addi-
tional function to his judicial service and status as a judge of the Supreme Court. The notion of “private life” thus 
(regrettably) tended to embrace virtually any act by the authorities vis-à-vis an individual, as a participant in the labour 
market or as a holder of a profession or any other official function. Update-note after the submission of the article: Quite soon 
the Court, having provided a survey of its private life case-law to date and having recapitulated its main principles, for-
mulated a broad doctrine, backed away from an excessively broad interpretation of the concept of “private life” as 
employed in Erményi (cited above), and found a complaint under Article 8, in many respects similar to that in Erményi, 
to be incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and thus inadmissible, although without formally denouncing 
Erményi (Denisov v. Ukraine ([GC], no. 76639/11, 25 September 2018).
66 Stafford v. The United Kingdom ([GC], no. 46595/99, § 82, 28 May 2002).
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anti-arbitrariness germ. For instance, Article 2 is directed against arbitrary deprivation of 
life; the purport of Article 5 is protection against arbitrary deprivation of liberty; that of 
Article 6 is guaranteeing the right to a fair, i.e. non-arbitrary, trial; Article 18 prohibits 
abusive restriction of individuals’ rights, i.e. their restriction by arbitrary exercise of power 
by authorities. The Court’s judgments, whatever their merits or disadvantages, thus are of 
anti-arbitrary spirit (and unfortunate exceptions do not alter the main direction). Some 
types of cases are especially telling in this regard, such as those pertaining to: excessive 
length of proceedings;67 torture;68 police violence69; non-implementation of courts’ final 
judgments70; secret detention sites71; or persecution of political opponents72.
Rule of law-related fragments of the Court’s doctrine are dispersed over its different 
judgments. The Court has never attempted to put them together into a lengthier 
whole.73 It uses the rule of law as an interpretational tool to give a meaning to a respec-
tive provision of the Convention, always in combination with one or several Articles of 
the Convention, which it considers to constitute a specific application of that principle.74 
Given the nature of the Strasbourg Court as an international court, the principle of sub-
sidiarity and the margin of appreciation reserved for member States, a universalised or 
too detailed definition of the ideal of the rule of law could be even counterproductive.75 
The Court has developed an authentic concept of the rule of law, which tallies in some 
respects with that formulated by the national courts, and yet it is far from embracing the 
whole comparative jurisprudential variety of this concept.
It took time for the Court to consolidate the rule of law as a general conventional 
principle. The rule of law initially came to be mentioned in judges’ separate opinions, 
rather than in the body of the Court’s judgments.76 Only in 1975, in Golder v. the United 
Kingdom, the Court noted that the Preamble of the Convention “points to [the rule of 
law] as being one of the features of the common spiritual heritage”, dismissed the inter-
pretation of the rule of law as of “a merely ‘more or less rhetorical reference’, devoid of 
67 Sürmeli v. Germany ([GC], no. 75529/01, 8 June 2006).
68 Gäfgen v. Germany ([GC], no. 22978/05, 1 June 2010).
69 Khamidov v. Russia (no. 72118/01, 15 November 2007).
70 Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009).
71 Al Nashiri v. Poland (no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014); Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (no. 7511/13, 24 
July 2014); Al Nashiri v. Romania (no. 33234/12, 31 July 2018); Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania (no. 46454/11, 31 May 
2014).
72 Gusinskiy v. Russia (no. 70276/01, 19 May 2004); Tymoshenko v. Ukraine (no. 49872/11, 30 April 2013); 
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 15172/13, 22 May 2014); Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan (no. 69981/14, 17 March 
2016); Merabishvili v. Georgia ([GC], no. 72528/13, 28 November 2017).
73 Constitutional courts sometimes produce lengthier texts on this issue, as they perform norm control and 
interpret the respective constitution as an integral act. For example, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court has done 
this in its ruling of 13 December 2004 (available in English at http://www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/170/ta1279/
content (accessed on 29 June 2018)), where it systematised many fragments of its rule of law doctrine, accumulated 
throughout years. Still, later rulings added new elements to this doctrine.
74 P. Lemmens. Op. cit., note 61 supra, pp. 240-241. For some constitutional courts (including the Lithua-
nian Constitutional Court), as courts of norms, it is not wholly uncommon to rule that the challenged legislation is 
in conflict with the constitutional principle of the rule of law (or another constitutional principle, such as separation 
of powers), conceived as an autonomous constitutional provision, although reflected in and permeating various arti-
cles of the respective constitution.
75 Cf. M. Krygier. Op. cit., note 37 supra, pp. 262–263.
76 See, e.g., Individual dissenting opinion of Judge [Mehmed] Zekia, Wemhoff v. Germany (no. 2122/64, 27 
June 1968).
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relevance for those interpreting the Convention”, and used it as a tool for interpretation 
of Article 6 § 1 (and, by extension, Article 8): “in civil matters one can scarcely conceive 
of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts”.77 This 
notion was soon referred to in another case in the context of Article 5 § 1; the Court 
rejected the respondent Government’s argument that the provisional arrest of the appli-
cant was justified under sub-paragraph b) of that Article insofar as the latter permits 
“lawful arrest or detention [intended to] secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law”, and stated that these words “concern only cases where the law permits 
the detention of a person to compel him to fulfil a specific and concrete obligation which 
he has until then failed to satisfy”, but their “wide interpretation would entail conse-
quences incompatible with the notion of the rule of law from which the whole Conven-
tion draws its inspiration”.78 In yet another case, where domestic legislation was 
challenged as permitting surveillance measures without obliging the authorities in every 
case to notify the persons concerned after the event, the Court stated that “[t]he rule of 
law implies, inter alia, that an interference by the executive authorities with an individ-
ual’s rights should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured 
by the judiciary, at least in the last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees of 
independence, impartiality and a proper procedure”.79 Not much later the “fundamental 
principle of the rule of law” was invoked for interpreting “authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary” within the context of Article 10.80 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the 
Court casuistically was filling this principle with concrete content, pertaining to: pre-
sumption of innocence;81 right to liberty;82 right to respect for private and family life;83 
freedom of expression related to the “belief concerning the nature of human life” and the 
“right to life of the unborn”;84 the right to appeal;85 interference by the legislature with 
the administration of justice aimed at influencing the judicial determination of disputes 
already pending before courts86 etc.
In this step-by-step manner, the Court proceeded to gradually intensify and solidify 
its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, adding this additional argument to 
the requirements (under various Articles of the Convention) often already formulated in 
77 § 34, note 60 supra. But see Separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice: “The importance attrib-
uted to the factor of the ‘rule of law’ … is much exaggerated. That element, weighty though it is, is mentioned only 
incidentally in the Preamble to the Convention. What chiefly actuated the contracting States was not concern for 
the rule of law but humanitarian considerations.”
78 Engel and Others v. The Netherlands ([Plenary], nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72 and 5370/72, § 
69, 8 June 1976). That paragraph refers to Golder (note 60 supra), but it is not explicitly stated in Golder that the 
(whole) Convention draws inspiration from the notion of the rule of law.
79 Klass and Others v. Germany ([Plenary], no. 5029/71, § 55, 6 September 1978). The Court found no viola-
tion of Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.
80 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom ([Plenary], no. 6538/74, § 55, 26 April 1979).
81 Salabiaku v. France (no. 10519/83, § 28, 7 October 1988).
82 Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom ([Plenary], 11266/84, § 58, 29 November 1988); Brannigan and 
McBride v. the United Kingdom ([Plenary], no. 14553/89, 14554/89, § 48, 26 May 1993).
83 Huvig v. France (no. 11105/84, § 26, 24 April 1990); Kruslin v. France (no. 11801/85, §§ 27, 30, 32, 36 
and 24 April 1990); Herczegfalvy v. Austria (no. 10533/83, §§ 88 and 89, 24 September 1992).
84 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland ([Plenary], nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88, § 69, 29 October 
1992).
85 Poitrimol v. France (no. 14032/88, § 38, 23 November 1993).
86 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece (no. 13427/87, §§ 46 and 49, 9 December 1994).
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its case-law. It is not excluded that the Court was inspired by the judgments of domestic 
constitutional courts (most notably of the German and Swiss ones) which it cited, where 
provisions of domestic legislation and (in cases of individual complaints) their applica-
tion were examined as to their compliance with the imperative of the rule of law, as 
(explicitly or implicitly) enshrined in a respective constitution.87
 The general doctrinal provision as to the scope of potential of use of the notion of 
the rule of law88 was introduced in 1996, in Amuur v. France: this concept was referred to 
as one “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”.89 That case concerned the depri-
vation of liberty, which, under Article 5 § 1, must be effected “in accordance with a pro-
cedure prescribed by law”. While substantiating that the principle of the rule of law is 
inherent in all the Articles of the Convention, the Court cited also the similar clauses of 
Articles 8 § 2, 9 § 2, 10 § 2, and 11 § 2, which all require that the “quality of the law 
… is compatible with the rule of law”.90 That Amuur formula was referred to in a num-
ber of Chamber judgments, and in 1999 it was adopted by the Grand Chamber;91 since 
then, it has become routine.
Under Article 1 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms “defined in Section I of [the] 
Convention”. The States thus must take all measures necessary to protect these rights, 
and if they are infringed, to rectify the matter. In the Court’s interpretation of the Con-
vention, the States have a positive obligation to set up a normative framework for ensur-
ing Convention rights. It falls on domestic law-making bodies. For the Convention 
purposes, domestic rules (even constitutional) governing the law-making competences 
of these bodies are irrelevant (unlike for constitutional courts that may disqualify as 
unconstitutional even such legislation which would ensure human rights, if it has been 
adopted by an inappropriate institution or in an inappropriate procedure). The said obli-
gation pertains to all Convention rights.
For an interference into a right to not constitute a violation of the Convention, the 
first condition is that it must be “provided by law” or “in accordance with the law”. 
These provisions require that that impugned measure has “some basis” in domestic 
law,92 which “must be adequately accessible and be formulated with sufficient precision 
87 Zimmermann and Steiner v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 8767/79, 13 July 1983); Glasenapp v. Germany ([Ple-
nary], no. 9228/80, 28 August 1986); Kosiek v. Germany ([Plenary], no. 9704/82, 28 August 1986); Lüdi v. Switzer-
land (no. 12433/86, 15 June 1992); Vogt v. Germany ([GC], no. 1785/91, 26 September 1995).
88 Other than the statement in Engel and Others (note 78 supra) that the whole Convention draws its inspira-
tion from the notion of the rule of law.
89 Amuur v. France (no. 19976/92, § 50, 25 June 1996).
90 Ibid. The notion of the quality of the law, however, was already used in some earlier judgments. Huvig v. 
France (§§ 26 and 29, note 83 supra); Kruslin v. France (§§ 27 and 30, note 83 supra); Herczegfalvy v. Austria (no. 
10533/83, § 88, note 83 supra).
91 Iatridis v. Greece ([GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, 25 March 1999); Stafford v. the United Kingdom (§ 63, note 66 
supra). A parallel: the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, while elaborating that all constitutional provisions are inter-
related and form an integral, harmonious system, held that the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of 
law is “a universal one upon which the whole Lithuanian legal system as well as the Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania itself are based” and that the content of the principle of a state under the rule of law “can be detected in 
various provisions of the Constitution” (ruling of 23 February 2000; available in English at http://www.lrkt.lt/en/
court-acts/search/170/ta1156/content (accessed on 29 June 2018)).
92 Kopp v. Switzerland (no. 23224/94, § 55, 25 March 1998); Amann v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 27798/95, § 
50, 16 February 2000); Rotaru v. Romania ([GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, 4 May 2000); Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The 
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to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct, he or she being able —if need be with 
appropriate advice— to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail”.93 Such requirements as clarity or legal 
certainty are quality requirements, an extension and specification of the general concept 
of the rule of law and its aide as of an interpretative tool. If the rule of law is inherent in 
all the Articles of the Convention, so must be its quality elements. For instance, legal 
certainty is held to be “implicit in all the Articles of the Convention and [to] consti-
tut[e] one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law”.94
In the Court’s case-law, quality of the law initially was mentioned sporadically, 
often referring to its predictability, foreseeability, accessibility and clarity, rather than 
to its substance. In Malone v. the United Kingdom the Court stated that “the phrase ‘in 
accordance with the law’ does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to 
the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law”.95 In the 1980s 
the expression “quality of the law” was used only episodically.96 In the 1990s, its usage 
—or that of its twin “quality of the legal rules applied”— intensified;97 in Kopp v. Swit-
zerland (and several other cases) the Court entitled a sub-section of the judgment “Qual-
ity of the law”.98 In some cases it moved towards limited inclusion in the concept of the 
“quality of the law” of more substantive elements. Yet in Malone the Court (having 
referred to the European Commission on Human Rights) interpreted the expression “in 
accordance with the law” as implying also that “there must be a measure of legal protec-
tion in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights 
safeguarded by [Article 8 § 1]”.99 This was echoed in Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United 
Kingdom: “A law which confers a discretion is not in itself inconsistent with this require-
ment, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated 
with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to give the individ-
ual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.”100 In at least two cases the Court, 
using the notion of the “quality of the law” in the context of the right to privacy, reiterated 
that Article 8 § 2 requires “the law in question” to be “compatible with the rule of law” in 
that sense that, “because of the lack of public scrutiny [of secret measures of surveillance or 
interception of communications by public authorities] and the risk of misuse of power, the 
domestic law must provide some protection to the individual against arbitrary interference 
Netherlands ([GC], no. 38224/03, § 81, 14 September 2010).
93 A, B and C v. Ireland (no. 25579/05, § 220, 16 December 2010).
94 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 13279/05, § 56, 20 October 2011).
95 Malone v. United Kingdom (no. 8691/79, § 67, 2 August 1984). The Court referred to two of its earlier 
judgments, wherein, however, the expression “quality of the law” has not been used.
96 James and Others v. the United Kingdom ([Plenary], 8793/79, § 67, 21 February 1986); Olsson v. Sweden 
([Plenary], no. 10465/83, § 61, 24 March 1988); Chappell v. the United Kingdom (10461/83, § 57, 30 March 
1989).
97 Huvig v. France (§§ 26 and 29, note 83 supra); Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden (no. 12963/97, § 
75, 25 February 1992); Kruslin v. France (§§ 12 and 30, note 83 supra); Herczegfalvy v. Austria (§ 88, note 83 supra); 
Halford v. the United Kingdom (no. 20605/92, § 49, 25 June 1997); Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (no. 
18139/91, § 37, 13 July 1995); Kopp v. Switzerland (§§ 55 and 66, note 92 supra); Lambert v. France (no. 23618/94, 
§ 23, 26–28, 24 August 1998); Amuur v. France (§ 50, note 91 supra); Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain (no. 27671/95, 
§§ 46, 53 and 60, 30 July 1998); McLeod v. the United Kingdom (24755/94, § 41, 23 September 1998).
98 Kopp v. Switzerland (§§ 62–75, note 92 supra).
99 Malone v. United Kingdom (§ 67, note 95 supra).
100 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (§ 37, note 97 supra). 
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with Article 8 rights”, therefore it “must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens 
an adequate indication as to the circumstances in and conditions on which public authori-
ties are empowered to resort to any such secret measures”.101 The foreseeability of law was 
underlined in some other cases, without directly mentioning the “quality of the law”.102 
The breakthrough came in 2000, when this expression was adopted by the Grand Cham-
ber in Amann v. Switzerland103 and two other cases.104
The quality of the law signifies a standard of its excellence. It is a one-to-many con-
cept. It refers to various formal aspects of the law, but also to all manner of elements of 
its content. The above-cited requirements for quality law bear primarily on its form and 
only indirectly on its contents. In terms of thick–thin spectre of concepts, they are closer 
to the thin side. Given that the quality of the law is an extension of the rule of law as an 
interpretative tool, used in combination with certain Articles of the Convention as spe-
cific applications of the rule of law, it is natural to expect that more substantive (thicker) 
elements of the rule of law are to be found in the doctrines pertaining to the interpreta-
tion of these Articles (similarly to their discovery, by constitutional courts, in various 
articles of even those constitutions which do not directly mention the rule of law or the 
law-governed state).
The Court’s rule of law doctrine recently has been recapitulated in De Tommaso v. 
Italy. The law in question should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable 
as to its effects; “a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with suffi-
cient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able —if need 
be with appropriate advice— to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circum-
stances, the consequences which a given action may entail”. The unattainable (even if 
highly desirable) is not required: the consequences of the action must not be foreseeable 
with absolute certainty; the level of precision cannot provide for every eventuality; and 
the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. It is conceded that 
many laws are inevitably couched in (to a greater or lesser extent) vague terms, whose 
interpretation and application are questions of practice. A foreseeable rule is such which 
affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities; 
if a law confers a discretion, it must indicate the scope of that discretion, but the detailed 
procedures and conditions to be observed do not necessarily have to be incorporated in 
rules of substantive law.105
Predictability of law and legal certainty as inherent elements of the rule of law and 
requirements for the quality of the law may have some peculiarities with regard to judge-
made law. In a case against the United Kingdom, the Court pronounced that “the word 
‘law’ covers not only statute but also common law”.106 It has not been expounded unequiv-
ocally as to how much inclusion of “common law” in the predictability of law requirement 
extends also to case-law of the courts that do not belong to common law tradition. But it has 
101 Halford v. the United Kingdom (§ 49, note 97 supra); Kopp v. Switzerland (§ 64, note 92 supra).
102 See, e.g.: Rekvényi v. Hungary (no. 25392/94, § 34, 20 May 1999); Hashman and Harrup v. the United King-
dom (no. 25594/94, § 31, 25 November 1999).
103 Amann v. Switzerland (§§ 50 and 55–63 (sub-section), note 92 supra).
104 Rotaru v. Romania (§ 52, 55 and 56, note 92 supra); Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 30985/96, 
§ 84, 26 October 2000).
105 De Tommaso v. Italy ([GC], no. 43395/09, §§ 106–109, 23 February 2017).
106 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom (§ 37, note 97 supra).
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been recognised that: “however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of 
law, including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation”; 
“[t]here will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to chang-
ing circumstances”; and that “the progressive development of the criminal law through 
judicial interpretation is a well-entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition”.107 It also 
has been elucidated that: legal certainty “guarantees certain stability in legal situations and 
contributes to public confidence in the courts”; the “persistence of conflicting court deci-
sions can create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial 
system, whereas such confidence is clearly one of the essential components of a State based 
on the rule of law …, especially when these conflicting decisions appear in similar cases 
heard in the same court which, in addition, is the court of last resort in the matter”; “the 
possibility of conflicting court decisions is an inherent trait of any judicial system that is 
based on a network of trial and appeal courts with authority over the area of their territorial 
jurisdiction”; “divergences may also arise within the same court”; “[t]hat, in itself, cannot be 
considered contrary to the Convention”; “[t]he requirements of legal certainty and the pro-
tection of the legitimate confidence of the public do not confer an acquired right to consist-
ency of case-law”; and “[c]ase-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper 
administration of justice, since a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach 
would risk hindering reform or improvement”. In line with this doctrine, the Court does not 
see its function in comparing different decisions of national courts, even if given in appar-
ently similar proceedings, as “giving two disputes different treatment cannot be considered 
to give rise to conflicting case-law when this is justified by a difference in the factual situa-
tions at issue”. In its assessment of the circumstances in which contradictory decisions by 
different domestic courts, ruling at final instance, entail a violation of the right to a fair hear-
ing, enshrined in Article 6 § 1, the Court, in its own words, is guided by the following cri-
teria: whether “profound and long-standing differences” exist in the case-law of the domestic 
courts; whether the domestic law provides for a mechanism for overcoming these inconsist-
encies; whether that mechanism has been applied and, if appropriate, to what effect.108 On 
such basis, the Court may find a either a violation,109 or no violation110 of Article 6 § 1.
The analytical divide between the formal and the substantive aspects of the quality 
of the law does not prevent them from being bridged. Where a law authorises a depriva-
tion of liberty, its quality implies sufficient accessibility, precision and foreseeability in 
its application to avoid all risk of arbitrariness;111 “lawfulness” covers procedural as well 
as substantive rules; and in a democratic society subscribing to the rule of law no arbi-
trary detention can ever be regarded as lawful.112 But generally law must not be precise 
to every detail; the level of required precision depends to a considerable degree on the 
content of the law.113 When assessing the quality of the law, a balance is sought between 
107 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 35343, § 155, 20 October 2015).
108 Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania ([GC], no. 76943/11, § 116, 29 November 2016).
109 See, e.g., Beian v. Romania (no. 30658/05, 6 December 2007).
110 See, e.g., Borg v. Malta (no. 37537/13, 12 January 2016).
111 Del Río Prada v. Spain ([GC], no. 42750/09, 21 October 2013)
112 Winterwerp v. the Netherlands (no. 630173/73, § 39, 24 October 1979).
113 As well as on the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. 
Vogt v. Germany (§ 48, note 87 supra); Rekvényi v. Hungary (§ 34, note 102 supra); RTBF v. Belgium (no. 50084/06, 
§ 104, 29 March 2011); De Tommaso v. Italy (§ 108, note 105 supra).
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its accessibility, clarity and foreseeability, and the need to avoid the “excessive rigidity 
of the law”.114 Also, the first-time application of the new law does not, in itself, render 
that law unforeseeable, because “there must come a day when a ... legal norm is applied 
for the first time”.115 The doctrine of the quality of the law having evolved that far, it is 
in fact immaterial whether a the notion of quality of the law is explicitly mentioned in 
a judgment: it is assessed anyway.
For example, a violation of Article 7 was found, where laws fixed different min-
imum penalties, and the public prosecutor had a discretion to decide in which court 
to try an accused and which particular punishment bracket applied to him.116 Where 
the applicant complained about the lack of any remedy before a national authority 
that could rule on his application for destruction of the file containing information 
about him and amendment of the inaccurate information, a violation of Article 13 
was found on account that domestic law had not made it possible to challenge the 
holding, by agents of the State, of information on a person’s private life or the truth 
of such information.117 In yet another case the applicant complained that during the 
first ten years of his postconviction detention for life his ability to receive prison vis-
its from his wife and other family members had been severely curtailed; a violation of 
Article 8 was found on account that a fair balance has not been struck between the 
applicant’s right to the protection of private and family life and a legitimate aim of 
isolating such people from society.118 But the Court was satisfied with the Constitu-
tional Court’s finding that the sanctioning of the court witness for not taking off his 
skullcap in the courtroom had a basis in the domestic law, which was far from being 
express on this issue.119
There may be a new trend showing up. In Roman Zakharov v. Russia, the Court 
found a violation of Article 8 on the account that domestic legal provisions governing 
interceptions of communications lacked clarity; did not provide for adequate and effec-
tive guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse; and did not ensure that secret 
surveillance measures are ordered only when “necessary in a democratic society”. The 
applicant was unable to allege that he has been subject to a concrete measure of surveil-
lance. Still he claimed to be a victim of a violation “by the mere existence of legislation 
which allowed a system of secret interception of communications, without having to 
demonstrate that such secret measures had been in fact applied to him”, because the 
“existence of such legislation entailed a threat of surveillance for all users of the telecom-
munications services and … amounted in itself to an interference with the exercise of his 
rights under Article 8”. The Court held that the “mere existence of the contested legis-
lation amounts in itself to an interference”.120 This non-formalism goes far, especially in 
view of abundant instances of restrictive approach to applicants’ victim status, as well 
114 Rekvényi v. Hungary (§ 34, note 102 supra). Balancing, however, is a challenging —if not essentially con-
tested— concept, owing to the contrariety of its paradigms. The aspect is not dealt with here.
115 Kudrevičius v. Lithuania ([GC], no. 37553/05, 15 October 2015).
116 Camilleri v. Malta (no. 42931/10, 22 January 2013).
117 Rotaru v. Romania (note 92 supra).
118 Khoroshenko v. Russia ([GC], no. 41418/04, 30 July 2015).
119 Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (no. 57792/15, 5 December 2017). The violation of Article 9 nev-
ertheless has been found on account of the disproportionality of the sanction to the legitimate aims pursued.
120 Roman Zakharov v. Russia ([GC], no. 47143/06, 4 December 2015).
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as the oft-repeated doctrine that the Court’s task is not normally to review the relevant 
law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which they were 
applied to or affected the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention. Or —
rather— it could go very far, if the application of this approach (which is by all standards 
applicant- and human-rights-friendly) is not confined to the circumstances of that par-
ticular case or those of other similar cases, where the very existence of impugned legisla-
tion poses a permanent threat to an individual’s right under the Convention and thus 
amounts to a direct infringement of the respective right. This “directness” perhaps is 
easier to substantiate in right to privacy cases, but such substantiation would not be as 
easy with regard to other rights enshrined in the Convention. The temptation for expan-
sion of this approach, however, may appear to be very strong and indeed irresistible 
(especially in cases of blatant disregard of rights). Even if one agrees in principle (as I do) 
that Russian domestic normative framework disregarded the right to privacy of popula-
tion at large (thus also of the applicant), the approach taken has resulted in the Court 
acting as a court of norms, i.e. a constitutional court.
Another indication of this trend (or departure from the more formalistic main-
stream) is the life imprisonment case-law. In Kafkaris v. Cyprus, the Court assessed the 
quality of the impugned law and, found a violation of Article 7 on account that as a con-
sequence of the change in the law, the applicant, a life prisoner, no longer could to have 
his sentence remitted, contrary to the requirement that the changes in legislation and 
in the conditions of release cannot be construed as imposing a heavier “penalty” than 
that imposed by the trial court. But the Court did not find a violation of Article 3, hold-
ing that life sentences in Cyprus were “both de jure and de facto reducible” by presiden-
tial pardon.121 In only five years, in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the Court’s 
approach to the lifers’ “right to hope” made a U-turn.122 Violations of Article 3 are 
found in cases where the Court holds that life sentences are irreducible, and they are 
considered to be irreducible even if there are such mechanisms available as presidential 
pardon (which was justified as sufficient in Kafkaris), amnesty, or release on compas-
sionate grounds. Legislative instruments are required, allowing for periodic review 
(upon request) of life sentences and proper consideration of the progress towards reha-
bilitation made by a lifer. What is more, in the absence of effective review, life sen-
tence’s incompatibility with Article 3 arises already at the moment of imposition of 
that sentence.123 Not calling into question the findings in Vinter and Others (they merit 
praise for promoting a humanist approach), this turnaround raises queries. How can a 
State be liable even in such cases, where the normative framework has not been 
121 Kafkaris v. Cyprus ([GC], no. 21906/04, 12 February 2008).
122 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069/09 130/10 3896/10, 7 July 2013).
123 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom (note 122 supra); Öcalan v. Turkey (no. 2) (no. 24069/03, 
197/04, 6201/06 and 10464/07, 18 March 2014); Trabelsi v. Belgium (no. 140/10, 4 September 2014); Lászlo 
Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10, 14 May 2014); T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (37871/14, 73986/14, 4 October 
2016); Murray v. The Netherlands ([GC], no. 10511/10, 26 April 2016); Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria 
(nos. 15018/11 and 61199/12, 8 July 2014); Matiošaitis and Others v. Lithuania (nos. 22662/13, 51059/13, 
58823/13, 59692/13, 59700/13, 60115/13, 69425/13 and 72824/13, 23 May 2017). Cf. Čačko v. Slovakia (no. 
49905/08, 22 July 2014); Bodein v. France (nr. 40014/10, 13 November 2014); Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom 
([GC], no. 57592/08, 17 January 2017); Harkins v. the United Kingdom ([GC], (dec.), no. 71537/14, 17 January 
2017).
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worsened (or even has been improved) since the last case against the same State, where 
no violation was found?124 If a person was sentenced to life imprisonment in the pre-
Vinter area, does that mean that the State has not complied with its obligation to set up 
a requisite normative framework already at the time of imposition of the sentence, 
although the existing framework met the criteria set forth in the Court’s case law?125 
How can the fact of absence of periodic review of life sentences alone render a life pris-
oner victim of violation of Article 3, if other mechanisms present in domestic legal 
framework offer some prospect (not really unreasonable) of early release, but a lifer 
deliberately makes no progress towards rehabilitation? And so on. These cases have 
moved the Court to the direction of constitutional courts, for whom examination of leg-
islative omissions is part of their routine job.126
The dark side of the quality-of-the-law-reasoning is that it can be a tool for justifi-
cation of impugned practices, if the Court holds that the sufficient quality of the legis-
lation applied justifies an interference into a Convention right. In Garib v. the Netherlands, 
the interference into the applicant’s freedom of movement was justified on that ground 
that the impugned legislation implemented the legitimate general measures (public 
policy).127 It may be argued that such approach is yet another indication of the Court’s 
progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts. The extreme manifestation of 
such reasoning is highlighting the lack of the quality of the law in the judgment’s oper-
ative part.128 On the other hand, in many cases a violation of a Convention provision was 
found owing to the unsatisfactory quality of the law (e.g., excessive rigidity), but the 
Court, having pointed to deficiencies, restrained itself from indicating them in the judg-
ment’s operative part: formally, violations were found on the account of the deficient 
manner of law-application, rather than deficiency of the law.129
Procedurally, the assessment of the quality of the law is a precondition for the 
assessment of law-application. This does not mean that, after it has been established 
that the impugned interference was based on the law, the quality of the law must be 
124 T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (note 123 supra). Cf. Törköly v. Hungary ((dec.), no. 4413/06, 5 April 2011). 
As one analyst put it (albeit in a different context), “ECtHR is allowed to ‘play’ the ‘living instrument’ as a soloist”. 
C. Djeffal. “Dynamic and Evolutive Interpretation of the ECHR by Domestic Courts? An Inquiry into the Judi-
cial Architecture of Europe”. In: H. P. Aust, G. Nolte (eds). The interpretation of International Law by Domestic 
Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2016, p. 177.
125 Matiošaitis and Others v. Lithuania (note 123 supra).
126 The Conference of European Constitutional Courts chose for its XIVth Congress (2008) the theme of 
legislative omission. The General report and national reports on respective practice are available in: E. Jarašiūnas 
(ed.). Les problèmes de l’omission législative dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle: Rapports. Problems of Legis-
lative Omission in Constitutional Jurisprudence: Reports. Vilnius: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithua-
nia, 2009.
127 Garib v. The Netherlands ([GC], no. 43494/09, 6 November 2017). On the echoing of this methodology 
that of Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 48876/08, 22 April 2013) see V. David. 
“Strasbourg Fails to Protect the Rights of People Living in or at Risk of Poverty: The Disappointing Grand Cham-
ber Judgment in Garib v. The Netherlands”. https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/11/16/strasbourg-fails-to-pro-
tect-the-rights-of-people-living-in-or-at-risk-of-poverty-the-disappointing-grand-chamber-judgment-in-garib-v-
the-netherlands/#more-4046 (accessed on 29 June 2018).
128 See, e.g., Kafkaris v. Cyprus (note 121 supra).
129 See, e.g.: Biao v. Denmark ([GC], no. 38590/10, 24 May 2016); Biržietis v. Lithuania (no. 49304, 14 June 
2016); Urbšienė and Urbšys v. Lithuania (no. 16580/09, 8 November 2016). This has been so even where violations 
found stemmed from constitutional provisions. Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina ([GC], nos. 27796/06 and 
34836/06, 22 December 2009); Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Moldova (nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07, 2 December 2014).
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scrutinised in each and every case. First of all, the applicants may not (and often do not) 
raise this issue at all. Also, many cases are routine, and it is not so that a big part of 
laws applied are unforeseeable, inaccessible or unclear. Lawfulness of interference often 
is postulated without much explicit reasoning. If the law-application lacked legal 
basis, this fact alone determines the finding of a violation of the respective provision. 
Where it has been shown that an interference was not in accordance with the law, it is 
not necessary to investigate whether it also pursued a legitimate aim or was necessary 
in a democratic society.130
But the Court sometimes skips the examination of the lawfulness of interference 
(thus also the examination of the quality of the law), when it finds that the interference 
complained of has not pursued a legitimate aim and/or was not necessary in a democratic 
society or not proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. Holding that the “issue with 
the quality of law is secondary to the question of the necessity of the impugned meas-
ure”131 may result from escapist stance in a sensitive matter or from pragmatic consider-
ations as to the best use of the Court’s resources, when scrutinising the quality of the law 
would be exceptionally time- and effort-consuming. But it also may result from (rightly 
or wrongly) perceived difficulties which the Court could encounter, where the issue 
under consideration is really borderline, so leaving the question of the quality of the law 
open would do less harm. National courts also employ various scope-of-examination-lim-
iting techniques. In an ideal world, a court of the rule of law would not skip such ques-
tions. But the Strasbourg Court is not part of (non-existent) ideal world, and it was not 
intended to be a court of the rule of law. It just turned out so.
IV. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION
This article is an agenda for reflection, so in fact no categorical or final conclusions 
can be presented. The quality of the law doctrine is an unfinished project. From the his-
torical perspective, it is still nascent. The rule of law doctrine is also evolving and will 
never be completed, because it is part of the legal tradition, where law, including its 
highest standards, constantly reinterprets itself and draws its potential for growth from 
self-reinterpretation. Being (still) pluralist, it has not one way of approaching issues. The 
Strasbourg Court’s approach to the rule of law and the quality of the law is one of them. 
Not the only one. Like any other court, the Strasbourg Court has had its ups and downs, 
its hours of glory and setbacks (korematsus too). The rule of law is what courts say about 
it, not some one court. Otherwise it would not be a shared idea. There is a lot of jurispru-
dential and other interchange between the Strasbourg Court and the judiciary of 
130 Khan v. the United Kingdom (no. 35394/97, § 28, 12 May 2000); Dobrev v. Bulgaria (no. 55389, § 165, 
10 August 2006); Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia (no. 37048/04, § 129, 13 January 2009); Church of Scientology of St 
Petersburg and Others v. Russia (no. 47191/06, § 47, 2 October 2014). As it is known, the typical test of examination 
of human rights cases (not only in the Strasbourg Court) consists of four steps, when it has to be established: (i) 
whether there had been an interference with a respective right; (ii) whether the interference was based on foreseea-
ble; accessible and sufficiently clear law; (iii) whether it pursued a legitimate aim; and (iv) whether it was necessary 
in a democratic society and proportional.
131 Bayev and Others v. Russia (nos. 67667/09, 44092/12 and 56717/12, §§ 63–64, 20 June 2017); Sekmadi-
enis Ltd. v. Lithuania (no. 69317/14, § 68, 30 January 2018).
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member States (so-called judicial dialogue), which facilitates coordination of their 
insights. Divergence, too, is there. But divergence is also part of a sharing process.
The quality of the law doctrine as an interpretative tool is a remarkable invention and 
at the same time the result of consequential development of the rule of law as a practicable 
concept. It is not uncontroversial and has not been always applied consistently. It leaves 
many questions open —and not only technical or procedural, but even fundamental ones. 
But it is a tool for searching for answers, in the same vein as the concept of the rule of law 
at large, which is also not a repository of answers “made in Strasbourg”. The quality of the 
law doctrine can help to determine, whether the law under examination satisfies quality 
standards, but it cannot tell which of the options, from which national legislators have to 
choose, is of the best quality. This pertains to all spheres regulated by law.
To take just one example, let us look at the rule of law requirement of fair trial (mak-
ing no references to specific respondent countries or the Court’s cases). Some states have 
jury trial, others do not. Among those who have it, patterns of jury composition and selec-
tion, their relationship with the professional judge in the case and modes of giving a ver-
dict vary. A question may be asked as to how to ensure that the jurors, who are laymen, are 
best prepared for their function and best perform it. Should they be instructed? If yes, then 
in what detail? Should they present reasons of the verdict? If yes, wherefrom do they know 
how to do this best? In some cultures it is believed that the instructions from the judge 
must be as thorough as possible. This seems to be in line with the Court’s case-law, where 
it is underlined that the person convicted by a jury must be able to understand the verdict. 
Yet in other cultures it is believed that the more detailed instruction to the jurors, the 
lesser their independence. This also seems to be in line with the Court’s case-law, with its 
emphasis of independence of courts. And what about countries which do not have jury? 
Their systems, too, seem alright for the Court’s case-law, because they are (rightly) held 
less prone to external influences, such as trial by media. Within such systems there is an 
inner differentiation: some states have only professional judges, others have professional 
judges in combination with lay judges. The latter also must be instructed as to how to per-
form and be able to explain their decisions. So, which system would be, so to say, of highest 
quality and most conducive to the rule of law?
Neither the doctrine of the quality of the law, nor the Strasbourg doctrine of the 
rule of law can answer such questions. Their counterparts at the national level are able of 
more, as they can propose what would be best for a specific country, basing their consid-
erations on a specific historical, cultural, political and legal heritage and their constitu-
tional identity. But their insights and proposals not necessarily can be transplanted to 
foreign soil without such negative side effects which would surpass their merits. Stras-
bourg doctrines, as interpretative tools, also can provide some general guidance —but 
only up to the limit where the domain of national constitutional identity begins.
Constitutional identity is yet another concept that provokes more questions than 
provides answers. The very notion has several meanings.132 It can be interpreted nar-
rowly, as relating only to constitutions, or broadly, where it includes historical and cul-
tural experience, underlying the respective country’s constitution. In general, the 
132 See, e.g., J. L. Marti. “Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. 
Identity of the people”. In: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds). National Constitutional identity and European 
Integration. Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2013.
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Strasbourg Court’s approach to member States’ constitutional identities is respectful, 
although there is always a risk that sensitive constitutional provisions will be treated 
just like any law. This risk, alas, sometimes materialises. There have been also opposite 
eccentricities, when the Court bowed —to the detriment of individuals’ rights— to 
what looked like national tradition, however dubious. To give just one example, in 1986 
the Court paid obeisance to the Irish constitutional tradition of prohibition of divorce. 
It held that the absence of provision for divorce under Irish law and the resultant inabil-
ity of the applicants (one of whom was formally in marriage with another person) to 
marry each other do not give rise to a violation of Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.133 
If one looks for an example of korematsu in the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, this is one. 
Since then, divorces have been legalised all over Europe and the world; it thus can be 
claimed that there is a solid worldwide consensus on this issue. Still, in 2017, in a case 
against Poland, the Court again held that the provisions of the Convention cannot be 
interpreted as guaranteeing a possibility, under domestic law, of obtaining divorce.134 
The Court fell hostage to its ancient (mildly put) questionable doctrine. In five years it 
resolutely moved from Kafkaris135 to Vinter and Others,136 so why could not it liberate 
itself from Johnston?137 After all, like the quality of the law doctrine is a tool, the Con-
vention is also but a tool for achieving justice and enabling people to pursue happiness. 
Or it should be.
Lastly, and despite certain inconsistencies (of which no one is insured, even the 
most professional of courts), the standards of the rule of law have not been only crystal-
lised by means of the Court’s adjudication —they have been strengthened. In this 
respect, the European human rights journey overall has been a success story. But can 
these standards weaken, or be lowered? Such possibility cannot be excluded, especially 
given some member States’ (whose number seems to increase) resistance to execution of 
the Court’s judgments— at times deliberate and demonstrative. Whether this anti-sys-
temic stance constitutes part of the alleged crisis of the Western legal tradition, or part 
of the rising new upheaval, which may once more result in this tradition becoming even 
stronger, is yet to be assessed in not so near future. In the meantime, and especially as no 
one knows what the Western world would be (if at all) after the rule of law, there is no 
alternative to making the best use of all the imperfect tools that its legal tradition has 
generated —including the interpretative ones.
***
TíTulo: Sobre el Estado de Derecho y la calidad de la ley: reflexiones del juez constitucional que deviene 
internacional.
AbsTrAcT: Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional 
justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common con-
cept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of 
which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this 
133 Johnston and Others v. Ireland ([Plenary], no. 9697/82, 18 December 1986).
134 Babiarz v. Poland (no. 1955/10, 10 January 2017).
135 Kafkaris v. Cyprus (note 122 supra).
136 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom (note 122 supra).
137 Johnston and Others v. Ireland (note 133 supra).
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Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has 
gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the 
Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not any-
more on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the 
law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere 
existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of 
respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional 
courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.
resumen: La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia 
Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común 
en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herra-
mienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos 
que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El 
autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitu-
cional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su 
confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de 
Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del 
demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a 
considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una 
interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. 
Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, 
quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.
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